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In the move to adopt rights based arrangements for renewable resources to avoid the 
losses of open access and the inefficiencies of prescriptive regulation, we argue that 
grandfathering the allotments of local users can be the most efficient distribution 
mechanism. We differ from the standard support among economists for auctions which 
contends that auctions allocate rights to the highest valued users and thereby maximize 
rents. Our contention is that rents are not a fixed stock as is commonly assumed, but 
rather depend upon the actions of those who use the natural resource and convert it into 
valuable goods and services. First-possession allocation assigns ownership and rents to 
existing users, reinforcing their incentives for stewardship and rent maximization. 
Resource rents are an important source of wealth and well being, especially in developing 
countries. By contrast the alternative, auction allocation, assigns ownership to winning 
bidders, but the rents are captured by the auctioneer, often the state, not local agents.  We 
argue that there can be important efficiency effects. Our empirical focus is on fisheries, 
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  How natural resources contribute to economic development largely depends upon 
whether they become assets, nurtured by users, or whether rents are dissipated through a 
“tragedy of the commons.”
1 Maximizing the rental stream requires a system of property 
rights that avoids a competitive race for rents and instills incentives for conservation of 
the resource and efficient production from it. The alternative of open access leads to 
excessive short-term output, under investment, and limited trade, reducing the wealth and 
welfare of those whose livelihood often depends upon the natural resource.  
  In developed countries, the initial response to open access generally has been 
prescriptive regulation to control entry and production. Both input and output controls are 
familiar regulations in fisheries, and they include limitations on seasons, entry, vessel 
sizes, and various harvest equipment and techniques, as well as restrictions on the amount 
and type of fish harvested.  In most cases, these have not been successful and there has 
been a move toward rights-based management (RBM) involving individual transferable 
quotas (ITQs), individual vessel quotas (IVQs), or other forms of catch shares of a total 
annual allowable harvest (Libecap, 2008). In this process, an important issue is allocation 
of rights.  
  In this paper we argue that first-possession or grandfathering the allotments of 
local users in existing fisheries can be the most efficient distribution mechanism for 
assigning property rights in fisheries.
2 In the case of renewable natural resources, the 
direct involvement of incumbent users is critical not only for management success, but 
for increasing rents. Locals often have the most complete information about the asset and 
the most effective and low-cost ways of producing from it and investing in it. Indeed, the 
capturing of additional resource rents created by entrepreneurial activities provides   2 
incentives for innovative new production/harvest methods and activities that conserve 
and enhance the resource. Rents are not a fixed stock given by nature as is commonly 
assumed, but rather depend upon the actions of those who use the natural resource and 
convert it into valuable goods and services. First-possession allocation assigns ownership 
and rents to existing users, reinforcing their incentives for stewardship. By contrast the 
alternative, auction allocation, assigns ownership to winning bidders, but the rents are 
captured by the auctioneer, often the state, not local agents.   
In contrast to the conventional view, we argue that there can be important 
efficiency effects from the allocation rule. In the case of renewable resources, such as 
fisheries, the assignment of rents to the state changes motivation for wise use and 
management by actual users. Natural resource rents can be reduced by the actions of the 
parties involved when they are heterogeneous in skills. Further, competition for the 
revenues secured by the state dissipates rents. Although there can be rent-seeking in 
determining the grandfathering rule, we argue that losses are likely to be comparatively 
small in most incumbent fisheries. 
We describe first-possession and auction allocation, and then illustrate some of 
the problems associated with auctions by presenting a political model that outlines 
opportunity for rent seeking with proposed CO2 emission permits. The efficiency 
arguments for auctions, whereby revenues are used to reduce distortive income taxes, are 
weakened by overriding political incentives to divert revenues to influential 
constituencies and the underlying wasteful competition this encourages. Experiences with 
the tobacco trust fund allocations demonstrate the point.     3 
We conclude by summarizing the benefits from regularizing fisheries across the 
world through rights-based systems and argue that grandfathering allocation mechanisms 
is preferable. Grandfathering rights to local fishers creates a stake in fishery management 
that encourages rent enhancement to increase wealth.  
 
Movement toward RBM  
Natural resource rents can be the basis for wealth creation, but they are vulnerable 
to dissipation under open-access conditions. As noted above, the lack of clear property 
rights (informal or formal, group or individual) to a resource encourages competition 
among agents, resulting in the standard losses of open access. Further, in the absence of 
any recognized property rights, the parties have little basis for bargaining with one 
another to constrain harvest or extraction and to re-allocate the resource to higher valued 
uses.
3 In the absence of price signals to reveal opportunity costs and in the presence of 
free riding, valuable labor and capital inputs are diverted from productive use to 
predation and defense, which in turn dissipates the in situ rents. Through these actions to 
capture the vale of common-pool resources, there is too much air pollution, overfishing, 
excessive deforestation, or undue depletion of groundwater and oil and gas deposits. 
Rights-based arrangements increasingly are considered as a solution to the 
tragedy of the commons.
 4 The more complete are property rights, the more the private 
and social net benefits of resource use coincide, reducing the losses created by 
competition in the common pool. Such arrangements may evolve from local practices as 
they did for land and minerals in the American West in the nineteenth century or they   4 
may be created from administrative decisions as in the case of tradable emission permits 
under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.
5   
The principal benefit of RBM is that it creates incentives for investment in the 
resource, provision of collateral for accessing capital for investment, more flexible 
exchange, greater information generation, and improved cost savings in meeting 
conservation or environmental objectives. For example, tradable emissions permits under 
the SO2 abatement program have been successful in meeting reduced pollution targets 
relative to prescriptive regulation, with a cost savings of over $1 billion (Stavins, 2007, 
23)  
In the case of fisheries, individual transferable quotas or shares to the annual 
allowable catch (TAC) were first suggested by fishery economist Francis Christy in 1973. 
(Hannesson, 2004, 71). Under this arrangement, the TAC is set by regulators based on 
assessments of the condition of the stock, and catch shares are assigned to fishers as a 
property right to the flow or harvest. In this manner, those fishers with ITQs have a long-
term indirect ownership relationship with the stock, and hence, are more motivated to 
protect it.    
Since 1973 economists have documented many advantages from implementing 
RBM in fisheries. Arnason (2002) summarizes international experiences with ITQs; 
Hannesson (2004) describes a general pattern of moving from uncontrolled entry to 
centralized governmental regulation (command and control) to adoption of property 
rights of some type; and Grafton, Squires, and Fox (2000) demonstrate the benefits of 
ITQs in the British Columbia halibut fishery. Using a global database for 11,135 fisheries   5 
from 1950 to 2003, Costello, Gaines, and Lynham (2008) find that implementation of 
catch
 shares halts, and even reverses, the trend toward widespread
 collapse.  
Although it is well established that ITQs can raise fishing incomes and motivate 
fishers to conserve stocks, they are found in less than two percent of the world’s fisheries 
(Costello, Gains, and Lynam, 2008). A fundamental question  is how to expand their 
coverage and what characteristics to include in their design.  
It is important to note that the losses of open access conceptually could be 
eliminated through the use of a Pigouvian tax. Such a tax placed on use of the common-
pool resource would raise the cost and reduce the effort to use it. In fact, however, such 
taxes are rarely applied. This is either because governments do not have the information 
to set a tax necessary to encourage optimal resource use, do not have the political power 
to do, so or both. Hence, though discussions of optimal taxation may be an interesting 
theoretical exercise, the only practical way to reduce or eliminate the tragedy of the 
commons in light of the ineffectiveness of most prescriptive regulation is through rent-
creating RBM. 
 
Alternative Allocation Systems 
The implementation of rights-based management requires an allocation 
mechanism, and as we will discuss below, the method chosen can have significant 
implications for rent maximization. Although there are a number of ways to assign 
property rights, we examine the two most common, first-possession and auction. 
 
   6 
First-possession 
  First-possession or grandfathering assigns ownership to existing users who 
generally obtained their claim on a first-come,  first-served or first-in-time, first-in-right 
basis. Such first possession rules recognize incumbent parties, who have experience in 
exploiting the resource and hence, are likely to be low-cost, high-valued users having 
out-competed less-efficient parties. Having a direct stake in access to the resource, 
incumbent users will be important constituents in a property rights distribution because 
they will want consideration of past investments---physical or human capital---in 
specific, non-deployable assets. By recognizing historical production patterns and capital 
outlays, first-possession rules signal security in property rights and encourage  future 
investments including those in the resource itself. First possessors recognize that the 
value of human and physical capital dedicated to the fishery depends upon maintaining 
and enhancing the value of the stock.  
  Establishing rights based on first possession necessarily requires reducing the 
access of some first-possessors to the fishery. It is this restriction that is the main source 
of rents created by RBM.  Consider the rents that exist even without entry restrictions, 
rents from individual fishing skills (normally thought of heterogeneity of fishers) or from 
resource-specific capital investments (information, knowledge, or equipment). To the 
extent that restrictions on entry rights are granted to first possessors in accordance with 
past shares and that the allocation is not anticipated so as to have caused a race to fish, 
the efficiencies gained in the first possession process will remain.  Furthermore, 
transferring rents from the first possessors to the polity, whether through a competitive 
auction or taxation, will not reduce the efficiency gains from restricting access.    7 
If the rights allocation does not follow past shares and if the rents are reallocated 
to the polity, however, there may be significant allocation or efficiency implications 
because bureaucratic and political processes are likely to be based on other criteria not 
consistent w ith efficient production. For example, nineteenth-century ranchers on the 
American frontier developed customary grazing territories encompassing the thousands 
of acres necessary for viable production under semi-arid conditions. In contrast, federal 
land laws imposed a 160-acre limitation that either led to farm failure or to costly efforts 
to circumvent legal restrictions (Libecap and Hansen, 2003; Hansen and Libecap, 2004; 
Libecap, 2007).  When initial allotments are not optimally sized, if transaction costs are 
low, as is likely among incumbents, then trade can take place if exchange is not restricted 
by size limits, as was the case under U.S. land law. Moreover, first possessors have an 
incentive to find ways to economize on transaction costs because they internalize any 
gains. 
First-possession has been criticized on fairness grounds because it discriminates 
against new entrants and may encourage large holdings. If first-possession ownership is 
viewed as rewarding those who by luck and connections got early access, such criticism 
may be warranted and may lead to political opposition to sanctioning of claims based on 
first possession (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005, 960-80).      
There may also be rent dissipation under first-possession, depending on the 
criteria used for allocation. For example, the rule-of-capture that applies in fishing, oil 
and groundwater extraction is a type of first-possession rule. Ownership is granted to the 
party that invests in extraction. But the rule-of-capture grants ownership to the flow and 
not generally to the resource stock. Hence in the presence of open-access conditions, first   8 
possession can exacerbate competitive extraction incentives, especially after first comers 
signal the value of the stock.
6 If the competing parties are homogeneous and ownership is 
short-term, then full dissipation is possible as parties rush to capture the asset. If, on the 
other hand, the parties are heterogeneous and use rights are long-term, first-possession 
assignments may be associated with limited rent dissipation.
7  
The same criticism of first-possession rules and rent dissipation applies if 
homogeneous claimants race to establish property rights to the stock (Anderson and Hill 
1990).8 But as before, if the parties are heterogeneous and the resulting rights are secure 
and permanent, full dissipation will not occur. Moreover, the winners of such a race are 
likely to be successful because they invested in the information and human capital 
necessary to obtain first possession and, as suggested earlier, may be the most efficient 
producers.  The more that allocation rules are based upon historical, unalterable use 
patterns, the less there will be significant dissipation.  On the other hand, in new fisheries, 
for example, where there is no record of past harvest, then announcement of the proposed 
rule can lead to wasteful efforts to be in compliance.9 Most of the world’s fisheries at risk 
of over exploitation, however, have comparatively long-standing harvest patterns. 
Finally, it is important to recognize that first-possession encourages efficiency 
because it draws upon existing local knowledge and encourages production of additional 
information and cooperation once rights are established. These actions can  increase 
resource-based rents. In the case of fisheries, knowledge of the response of the stock to 
different management regimes, exogenous weather effects, and shifts in endogenous 
factors, such as fishing effort, is especially valuable. Based on this information, fishers 
can coordinate harvest practices to enhance their returns as well as the condition of the   9 
stock, and they can collaborate with regulators in setting the total allowable catch which 
in turn not only reduces resistance to the catch limit, but incorporates stock and habitat 
information collected by the industry. Because there is less antagonism between fishers 
and regulators in these circumstances, marine scientists are more likely to take account of 
industry recommendations and insights to advance the fish stock and achieve more 
effective regulatory policies. Accordingly, ITQs based on first-possession can lead to 
more beneficial private and collaborative fishing along with the setting of more optimal 
annual harvest rates, reduced free-riding, and greater compliance by fishers.10 
 
Auction 
Auctions are another way of allocating access rights to the commons, and there 
are several reasons to support this method on efficiency and equity grounds.
11 First, 
auctions may place the resource directly into the hands of those who have the highest 
value for  it and thereby avoid the transaction costs of re-allocation. Second, auctions 
generate information about the value of the resource. And finally, auctions transfer rents 
to the state (as the seller), an issue we examine in detail below.  
The amounts and distribution of rents created by an auction depend upon auction 
design, which can be complex. The net amount of the rents created depend on the auction 
costs, on measurement and enforcement costs following the auction, and on the lobbying 
costs invested in influencing the terms that may provide specific advantages to certain 
groups during or after the auction. 12 
In practice, auctions have been adopted more rarely than economists who espouse 
their virtues might like. For example, ITQs in fisheries have generally been grandfathered   10 
rather than auctioned, and SO2 permits under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 
were granted to existing emitters (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1998) Nonetheless, auctions 
have been called for to allocate CO2 emission permits to limit greenhouse gas emissions 
under cap and trade regimes. 
The major argument for auctioning permits for carbon emissions to create a cap-
and-trade system is that the auction revenues can go to the state, as compared to 
individual firms, and that these revenues can be used to broadly benefit the public by 
reducing distortive income taxes. If this happens, society could achieve both the public 
good of less carbon emissions and a more efficient tax structure. Whether this happens, 
however, depends on the political framework that actually determines the allocation of 
auction revenues. Later we will analyze the probable allocation results in the context of a 
realistic model of political rent allocation. 
 
The Nature and Role of Rents in Resource Management 
  Although there is consensus among economists and resource managers that RBM 
is the most practical way of reducing losses from open access and of generating wealth 
associated with natural resources, questions remain about whether the rents created by 
RBM will be subsequently captured, enhanced, or dissipated. Here we focus on how 
allocation of the rents to users or to government will affect the rents spawned by RBM.  
  In general the economics literature contends that resource allocation is invariant 
to rent taxation and that an auction (which can be thought of as a form of taxation) is the 
preferred method for assigning rights because it ensures that they will go to those users 
who value them the most.
13 Rents are viewed as invariant to human action and therefore,   11 
agents will continue to produce efficiently even if the rents are eliminated either via a 
lump sum tax or auction. For example, Clark, Major, and Mollett (1989, 138) argue that 
the economic rent generated by the creation of transferable fishing quotas “can either be 
taxed away by the government or left in the fishery to be capitalized into the value of the 
ITQ.” If the right is auctioned, the winning bid will be determined by the highest 
expected future value of the rental stream. In this context, rents are returns over and 
above opportunity costs, and therefore their distribution will not affect resource 
allocation.  
  We argue, however, that the amount of rents created and saved through RBM is 
not invariant to allocation for at least three reasons. The first is that the rents created by 
RBM and transferred to government, whether by auction or taxation, will be competed 
for in a potentially-rent dissipating political process. As we discuss below there are 
theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that such rent dissipation is more likely than 
not.   
  The second reason lies in the process whereby rents are created. The notion of in 
situ resource rents suggests that they arise simply from the natural existence of the 
resource to which homogeneous units of other inputs are applied. Computing the rents is 
a simple matter of subtracting the cost of other inputs from the value of the output 
created. As long as the resource remains open to access by all, rents at the margin will be 
fully dissipated by competing entrants. Hence, rents are dissipated or created by 
increasing or reducing the amount of additional factors employed in resource use.  
  Ignored in this reasoning is the role that heterogeneous resources play in the 
production process. Following Johnson and Libecap (1982) and Johnson (1995), it is   12 
important to recognize that even under a completely open access regime, some rents will 
be captured by infra-marginal users. These users might be first entrants who recognized 
the value of the resource before others, users who apply superior management skills to 
the resource production process, or those who have invested in human capital most likely 
through learning-by-doing. In any case and especially for a resource that has been 
exploited for a long time by users who have acquired time and place specific information 
about the resource, there will be a sorting process that leaves some rents for the infra-
marginal, more efficient producers. The amount of these rents, of course, will depend on 
the contribution that heterogeneous inputs make to the value of the production process.  
In any case, not all resource rents arise solely from the mere existence of the asset. Some 
additional rents are generated by the productive activity of inputs that turn the resource 
into valuable products and services. An example is harvesting and marketing fish in a 
manner that insures that the highest valued product is delivered to market. Such actions 
generally involve added costs and coordination among fishers. 
  In this context, consider the incentive effects of redistributing these rents to 
government whether by auction or taxation. What are the implications for the 
inframarginal, low-cost producer who has managerial or entrepreneurial talent that 
generates additional value? Such talents are likely to have alternative uses. If rents are 
eliminated in the resource sector, the entrepreneur/manager will shift effort elsewhere 
where the inputs are somewhat lower valued, but earn rents, thus creating an allocation 
effect. Of course, exit by one resource users will open the door for another, but the new 
user will be less efficient and therefore will create fewer rents from the resource and less 
social value.    13 
  The third reason that rent distribution matters for rent creation relates to 
information and coordination costs in the production process. In general those who 
acquire first possession rights do not do so randomly. Whether they are rushing for gold 
or racing to fish, first entrants have some reason to believe they are best able to generate 
and secure rents.
14 Moreover, once first possessors acquire rights, they begin securing 
production information that increases the rents they capture. Redistribution of those rents 
to the state reduces the incentive to discover and the incentive to acquire information 
thereafter. As a result, total wealth generated from the resource is reduced.  
This implication is even more apparent once secure rights are assigned under 
RBM in fisheries. The owners of an ITQ have an incentive to make two types of 
investment. One type of investments would generate private returns. These returns could 
result from investing in finding better information about where the more productive 
locations are or from augmentation of the resource’s future production if that value is 
captured by the investor. Known investment potential would be incorporated into the 
expected value of secure quotas, but opportunities that evolve as owners search for 
additional rents require added effort. If entrepreneurs expect the returns on those 
investments to be taxed away, the incentive to engage in this socially-valuable activity is 
eroded.  
An example from the New Zealand abalone fishery is illustrative.
15 Until RBM 
was implemented in 1986, abalone divers needed only a non-transferable license to 
harvest in what was o therwise an open-access resource. Under these conditions, they 
harvested as much as possible and did not invest in the stock, which declined.
16 RBM, 
however, allowed divers a tradable share in a total cap established by fishery authorities.   14 
As a result, quota values rose an order of magnitude from approximately NZ$33,000 per 
metric ton in 1988 to NZ$320,000 per metric ton in 1993.  
Some of this increase resulted directly from reduced access, but additional returns 
were due to value-enhancing investments by individual fishers. Under RBM there was an 
opportunity to earn even more than the divers initially were realizing. To achieve these 
gains, the diving business had to be redefined with a new business model. Specialized 
dive boats with support crews for harvesting abalone were introduced. Research into 
other abalone fisheries, market trends, and processing operations was conducted, and 
abalone aquaculture was started with the development of an “aqua barrel,” a molded 
polyethylene barrel in which abalone could be planted, grown, and harvested.  
Such innovations resulted from investment made by heterogeneous, 
entrepreneurial fishers such as Roger Beattie. He diversified into Sea-Right Investments 
Limited, a company that invested in developing an abalone pearl culture operation. Sea-
Right obtained permits for developing a five-hectare marine farm site in Akaroa Harbour 
in 1994 and purchased farmland adjacent to the marine farm for NZ$600,000 to secure 
the company’s interests by protecting it from effluent.
17  Beattie described the importance 
of RBM for the success of his business: “Property rights changed the company from a 
hunter/gatherer at the ends of the earth to a business launching into the top end of the fine 
jewelry market in sophisticated world capitals.”
18 
The disincentive created by reallocation of rents away from the producer is even 
more critical if they require collective action. Johnson (1995, 337) notes that a quota 
system “provides incentives for the industry to act collectively to lower costs and engage 
in activities such as product development and fishery management that have the potential   15 
to increase quota value.” Pooling information on resource availability could increase 
collective rents. Cooperation to invest in technology dependent on economies of scale is 
more likely if the returns on such investments cannot be competed away by unrestricted 
entry. Again quoting Johnson (1995, 337) “because the identities of the participants are 
known, organizational costs are lower than in an open access setting.” Creating collective 
rents requires undertaking coordination costs for which there is only a return once rights 
are established. If those rents resulting from their coordination efforts do not remain with 
the owners, the investments will not be made, a welfare loss will occur, and social wealth 
will be less. 
Again an example, this time from Alaska, is illustrative as described in recenty 
work by Deacon, Parker, and Costello (2008). The Chignik sockeye salmon run has 
suffered from the same open-access issues that plague most such fisheries. Access was 
limited by regulation of season, licensing, and equipment, but the fishery continued to be 
over exploited. Between 2002 and 2004, however, a self-selected cooperative operated 
under approval from the Alaska Board of Fisheries. Because members of the cooperative 
shared in the rents created by the cooperative, they had an incentive to undertake the 
costs of collective action. These cooperative efforts included, reducing the number of 
vessels in the fishery by 60 percent, pooling of information about the location of fish, and 
positioning barriers or “fences” to channel fish to locations where they could be more 
effectively caught in nets. Importantly, such actions were not undertaken by independent 
fishers who did not join the cooperative, suggesting that rights to the rents created were 
critical for investment decisions.    16 
  Because rent creation and augmentation are sensitive to rent distribution, there is 
good reason to base RBM on first possession and to allow rents to be captured at the local 
level. Competition for first possession could lead to some dissipation, but as we describe 
above, when the parties are heterogeneous not all rents will be lost. Moreover, in 
fisheries, if grandfathering is based on historical catch and vessel size, there will be little 
opportunity for competitive waste. Local users have the greatest knowledge of the 
resource and of  how it is likely to respond to alternative management schemes. 
Moreover, the  wealth and well-being of local users  depend upon the protection and 
indeed, maximization of rents. If these parties perceive that their actions to reduce 
exploitation and to conserve the resource are linked to a commensurate increase in rents 
that they capture, then they are motivated to protect and enhance the value of the 
resource. When incumbent users are residual claimants to rents that are created, there will 
be “buy in” for a new regime.
19  
On the other hand if they expect the rents to be taxed away through auction, there 
is an incentive for the most efficient users to exit; for reduced investment in the resource; 
and accordingly, for lower levels of wealth and welfare. Those who remain with fewer 
other options will provide lower value and may have less incentive to comply with 
management. Moreover, the revenues raised from auctions have no clear property rights, 
resulting in political rent dissipation as potential recipients compete for control. We now 
turn to this issue.  
 
The Politics of Allocating Resource Rents 
The literature in economics and political science indicates that government   17 
delivery of collective goods for the broad public and particularistic goods for private 
constituencies results from a complex political process. The mix depends upon political 
bargaining among legislators who prefer public goods or private goods or some 
combination of both. Politicians have to weigh the political benefits and costs of the 
tradeoffs associated with these choices, issues that have not been carefully addressed by 
auction advocates. Accordingly, it is not possible to assert that auction revenues will be 
targeted to income tax reduction or other public goods activities, rather than to interest 
group transfers. They may, or may not, depending on political preferences and 
negotiations.  
In the United States vote-maximizing politicians represent narrow jurisdictions 
and must be responsive to them, at least to some extent, in considering broader policy 
objectives. Volden and Wiseman (2007) describe how politicians trade off the political 
returns from providing various combinations of collective and particularistic goods, 
subject to the constraint of a fixed budget. A winning congressional coalition must be 
assembled before any proposed mix can be selected.20 Proponents of a particular policy 
must offer budget distributions to constituencies and projects favored by their colleagues 
in order to win their support. These necessary political exchanges reduce the funding 
available for the initial public objective. Volden and Wiseman (2007, 84) argue that 
paradoxically, the greater the value placed on the public good, the more it will be under-
provided by Congress. Those who support the public good will be willing to pay even 
more to entice the backing of their reluctant colleagues. In the case of auction revenues, 
this argument suggests that even if tax reduction is highly valued by many members of 
Congress, at least some and perhaps a considerable amount of the funds will be directed   18 
to particularistic constituent services valued by those who otherwise would oppose cap-
and-trade. Moreover, in this case, politicians prefer an open rule allowing for 
amendments in debate, making it more difficult to ex ante to lock in income tax reduction 
as part of legislation authorizing a permit auction.
21  
Accepting that auction revenues are likely to be diverted to private constituent 
services, we must ask how revenues are allocated among competing demands and to what 
extent this competition for transfers will dissipate rents. Following Peltzman (1976) and 
Becker (1983), vote m aximizing politicians must trade off the marginal votes gained 
from providing transfers to interest groups with votes lost from taxpayers. Under their 
models none of the parties get all that they want; taxpayers pay more taxes than they 
would otherwise prefer; and constituent groups get fewer transfers. In this process, 
politicians balance the incremental gains or losses in votes as tax-funded transfers are 
provided to interest groups. 
Now amend this framework to consider a scenario where politicians distribute 
revenues from a lump-sum tax on a well defined group—for example, revenue from 
auction of resource use rights---rather than revenue from an income tax. In this case, 
because the revenues are generated as part of a regulatory process to control access to a 
resource, the marginal votes lost from using the revenues to fund constituent transfers 
may be less than if taxes are explicitly levied for these transfers. Hence, tax revenues so 
generated will be considered a windfall by politicians. Political theory (Gramlich and 
Galper, 1973; Fisher,1982; Hines and Thaler, 1995) suggests that revenue windfalls result 
in expenditure increases that exceed those that would be funded through taxes on similar 
increases in income.
22 Accordingly, Congress may use an auction windfall to provide   19 
more transfers than would otherwise be the case.  
How will the distribution of the revenue windfall be decided? Again, following 
Peltzman (1976) and Becker (1983), as well as the insights of Krueger (1974); Buchanan, 
Tollison, and Tullock (1980); and Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishney (1993), interest groups 
will compete for transfers by lobbying. The more homogeneous, wealthy, and small the 
group, the more likely it will be successful because the groups interests are aligned, 
because the group has resources and because there is less opportunity for free-riding 
(Olson, 1965). Under these conditions, a large, heterogeneous group of taxpayers, who 
might prefer the income tax reductions suggested by auction proponents, are at a relative 
disadvantage in political bargaining, making less money available for tax reduction than 
auction proponents have suggested. Making matters worse, competition among interest 
groups preferring particularistic goods from auction revenues will further dissipate rents.  
In support of these concerns consider the proposed use of cap-and-trade auction 
funds by the Obama Administration of $645 billion or more. The administration plans to 
dedicate $15 billion a year of revenue from the sale of emissions permits to develop new 
sources of clean energy. But that leaves a large pool of potential government income that 
will be up-for-grabs by lobbyists as they compete for funds for constituent projects rather 




Tobacco Trust Fund Allocations  
To get a sense of how politicians actually have distributed funds between public 
and particularistic goods and the rent dissipation involved in determining who receives   20 
those transfers, we consider the case of the Tobacco Trust Fund allocations. In November 
1998 a settlement was reached between the major U.S. tobacco producers and 46 states.
24 
The lawsuit was brought by the states’ attorney generals on behalf of their state’s 
Medicaid programs seeking compensation for healthcare expenditures attributed to 
smoking. The Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) between the states and four major 
tobacco companies, representing over 99 percent of the domestic cigarette market, 
required that the tobacco companies make annual payments to the states in perpetuity. It 
also restricted the marketing and advertisement of cigarettes and required a five-year, 
$1.5 billion dollar contribution toward the establishment of the American Legacy 
Foundation for anti-smoking education. In exchange, state lawsuits against the 
participating tobacco manufactures were dropped.
 25 Total payments were projected to be 
$206 billion over the first 25 years (Schroeder 2004). Funding first became available in 
2000. To date, $79.2 billion from tobacco settlement money has been received by the 
states.  
The MSA stated that the awards were to provide “significant funding for the 
advancement of public health, the implementation of important tobacco-related public 
health measures” (MSA, 2), and most states indicated their intent to use the funds to pay 
for the costs of Medicaid from smoking-induced illnesses and pay for tobacco control 
programs (Schroeder 2004). Indeed, part of the formula determining the allocation of 
payments across states was based on smoking-related medical costs and expenditures.
26 
These latter costs are paid in annual installments from 2008 through 2017 (Singhal 2008).  
  The annual payments states receive are adjusted in two ways—inflation and 
volume. The volume adjustment is based on  the total volume of cigarettes shipped   21 
nationally and is not state specific. State allocations of the initial and annual funds are 
based on two equally-weighted factors: a state’s share of smoking-related medical costs 
and a state’s share of smoking-attributable Medicaid expenditures (Singhal 2008). The 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) provided states with a minimum 
funding recommendation for tobacco control programs based on the demographics of 
each state (CDC 1999). 
  Given the focus on tobacco-related health expenses, tobacco control programs to 
reduce smoking, and compensation for communities adversely affected by the settlement, 
it is instructive to see how the states have actually used the settlement funds. Table 1 
describes the allocations across categories between 2000 and 2005. What is most 
noticeable is that Budget Shortfalls are the second largest category and that other 
expenditures are for areas unrelated to tobacco health or control issues. Debt service on 
securitized funds (5.4 percent) reflects the actions by states to issue bonds based on future 
annual payments from the tobacco settlement. These funds are used to help balance state 
budgets (NCLS 2003). Between 2000 and 2005 16 states securitized some or all of their 
settlement proceeds. In 2005, four states, California, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and 
Wisconsin, allocated all of their annual MSA payments to servicing debt on securitized 
funds (GAO 2006, 2007).  
A report titled “A Decade of Broken Promises” written by four anti-smoking 
lobbies found that in the last 10 years states spent only 3.2 percent of total tobacco 
generated revenue (MSA funds and tobacco taxes) on tobacco prevention and cessation 
programs.
27 No state funding tobacco prevention programs at the CDC-recommended 
level, and only nine states fund them at over 50% the recommended levels (Campaign for   22 
Tobacco-Free Kids 2008).28  
 
Table 1 
Tobacco Trust Fund Allocations 
Category  Amount  Percent 
Health  $16.8 billion  30% 
Budget Shortfalls  12.8  23 
Unallocated  6.6  12 
General Purposes  4.0  7 
Infrastructure  3.4  6 
Education  3.1  5.5 
Debt Service on Securitized Funds  3.0  5.4 
Tobacco Control  1.9  3.5 
Economic Development for Tobacco Regions  1.5  2.7 
Social Services  1.0  1.7 
Reserves/Rainy Day Funds  .8  1.4 
Tax Reductions  .6  1.1 
Payments to Tobacco Growers  .5  .9 
GAO (2007).    
 
It is apparent that much of the tobacco trust fund allocations support activities 
unrelated to tobacco health or control despite the spirit of the MSA. The associated 
political allocation likely involves rent seeking activities as lobby groups mobilize to 
channel funds in their direction or to protect existing allocations. Windfall allocations 
attract lobbying from interested parties who seek to direct funds their way. A survey by 
Austin-Lane et al. (2004) found that tobacco control and prevention advocacy is one of 
the most important factors influencing revenue allocation. Sloan et al. (2005) find that 
interest groups behaved as expected: tobacco-producing states spent less on tobacco-
control and states with more per capita teachers and more American Medical Association 
members per capita spent more on it. Further, reports issued by the American Cancer   23 
Society, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, the American Lung Association, and the 
American Heart Association, suggest that those groups are actively working to influence 
MSA payments (Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids 2008). 
 
Fishing for Rents 
 
In general, the opportunity to use RBM in fisheries as a revenue source has not 
attracted the attention of politicians in the same way that potential windfalls from CO2 
emission permits have. Perhaps in part for that reason, the movement towards RBM in 
fisheries has occurred through first possession, rather than auctions. And they have had 
remarkable success. But much more is possible.29 The following case examples from the 
developing world suggest the potential economic rents available from RBM. The loss of 
economic benefits in fisheries is not restricted to developing countries, however. Partly 
because of higher subsidies in developed countries the loss of economic rents can be even 
higher than in the developing world.
30 
 
Bangladesh:  The hilsa shad (Tenualosa ilisha) fishery is the largest single species 
fishery in Bangladesh. The potential annual net economic benefits from the 
fishery are in the order of US$ 260 million compared to little or no net economic 
benefits under the existing management regime. The fishing effort (measured in 
standardized boat units) required to attain sustainable maximum economic 
benefits is about one-third of the current fishing effort.
31    24 
Vietnam:  Currently there is excessive capacity and over fishing in the fisheries in 
the Gulf of Tonkin.  The potential net economic benefits from improved 
management are some 56 percent greater than the current level, and the catch 
could be achieved with approximately 46 percent of the current level of fishing.
32  
China:  The loss of rents in the Bohai and Yellow Sea fisheries due to over 
exploitation are in the order of US$1 billion annually, or approximately double 
the current level of net economic benefits (economic rents).33 Remedies will 
require major reductions in fishing effort and the number of vessels involved. 
Peru: The Peruvian anchoveta fishery is the largest single stock fishery in the 
world. The El Nino phenomenon, as well as excess capacity, has resulted in 
economic losses of US $400 million annually.  Excessive fleet and processing 
capacities are estimated to be in the order of 60-70 percent and between 65 and 80 
percent, respectively.
34 
Namibia:  Despite a reputation for being comparatively well managed, the net 
economic benefits (economic rent) in the Namibian hake fishery of N$ 222 
million in 2002 could potentially quadruple to an estimated N$1200 million if the 




This discussion suggests that there are large benefits to be gained from 
improved management of the world’s fisheries, especially in inshore fisheries. 
Rights-based management systems have a proven record in promoting fishing 
practices that raise rents and welfare. For community-based fisheries, where the   25 
participants are often poor, but well informed about the resources on which they 
depend for their livelihood, effective policy design is essential. A key aspect of 
this process is the allocation mechanism. There are strong reasons to believe that 
first possession, or grandfathering based on past fishing effort and capacity, is 
more likely to elicit local support, maintain the rents in the community, reduce 
costly rent seeking, and direct the actions of fishers toward advancing the stock. 
An RBM approach not only encourages more efficient use of the fishery or other 
natural resources, but it helps build an institutional infrastructure based on 
property rights and the rule of law that can sustain economic growth where 
traditional development approaches have failed.   26 
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Endnotes 
 
                                                                  
1 Resources solely with amenity values may not require investment and production for value. For the losses 
of open access, see Hardin (1968). Indeed, under certain circumstances resources can be a barrier to growth 
as argued by the resource curse literature. See Humphreys, Sachs, and Stigliz (2007).   
2 See discussion of first possession in Epstein (1979), Rose (1985), and Lueck (1995, 1998).   
3 Bargaining of the kind discussed by Ronald Coase (1960) is not possible. 
4 See Stavins (2007) for discussion of the movement toward market-based instruments.   
5 For discussion, see Libecap (2007, 2008) and Anderson and Hill (2004). For example, consider success 
under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 in designing air pollution emission permits for lowering the 
cost of meeting air quality targets (Tietenberg 2005  395-402). 
6 The property right is granted to the flow, rather than to the stock, because stock ownership may be too 
costly to define and enforce due to the nature of the resource or to political constraints.  For discussion of 
reasons to limit alienation in these cases, see Johnson and Libecap (1982). 
7 Johnson and Libecap (1982) show that heterogeneity among fishers limits rent dissipation even under 
open-access and the rule of capture. 
8 Stavins (1995) refers to grandfathering as a give away. See also Haddock (1986) for criticism of rent 
dissipation when the parties are homogeneous. 
9This situation is illustrated by the race to capture land rights under the Oklahoma land rush and the origin 
of the term “sooners.” See Anderson and Hill, chapter 9. 
10 In a similar setting, Johnson (1995) has shown that the imposition of taxes on quota rents in ITQ 
(individual transferable quota) fisheries could lead to reduced incentives of fishers to conserve (invest in) 
the fish stock.   
11 For summary of auction issues, complications, and applications, see McAfee and McMillan (1987), 
Milgrom (1989), and Klemperer (2002). 
12 See discussion by McMillan (1994) regarding the experimentation and costs of designing auctions for the 
spectrum. 
13 An important exception is Johnson (1995) who challenges the view that resource rents can be taxed 
without distortionary effects. 
14 The allocation rule under first possession can have a sorting effect to raise values. In the case of the 
Homestead Act under US land law in the 19
th century, the requirement to occupy and farm a plot for five 
years may have served to direct claiming to those who had farming skills.  
15 For a more complete discussion see “Property Rights in New Zealand Abalone Fisheries,” Graduate 
School of Business, Stanford University, Case Number P-28, May 2001. 
16 There was an indirect limit imposed on the abalone harvest, because abalone processors faced a cap on 
what they would buy due to export quotas. These export quotas were neither property rights nor 
transferable, however, and so they did nothing to encourage divers to stop the fishery’s decline or help the 
fishery grow.  
17 Akaroa Harbour was to the southeast of Christchurch, across the Banks Peninsula. 
18 Email communication from Sea-Right Investments Limited, December 2, 1999. 
19 Consider the In defense of the former, witness the ability of cattlemen’s associations to establish 
customary grazing rights. See Libecap 2007.  Anderson and Hill (1975, 1983, 1990, 2004) provide multiple 
examples from the American West consistent with bottom -up evolution of property rights in response to 
changing resource values and changing costs of definition and enforcement. 
20 Volden and Wiseman (2007) begin with a homogeneous legislature where politicians have similar 
preferences and then relax that assumption. In either case, the predictions hold.  
21 Volden and Wiseman’s argument is in contrast to Baron and Ferejohn (1989) who argue that politicians 
generally prefer closed rules (no amendments) to reduce bargaining costs, when a single good is valued. 
22 This is the so-called “flypaper effect,” a description of how government block grant money sticks where 
it hits. 
23  Obama’s Green House Gas Gamble, John Broder, NYT, 2/27/09 
24 Four other states, Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi, and Texas, had previously reached individual 
settlements with tobacco companies that totaled $40 billion. Also the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and   37 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
four territories joined the 46 States in the MSA. 
25 The four major tobacco companies to initially settle were Brown & Williamson, Lorillard, Philip Morris, 
and R.J. Reynolds.  Since 1998, other tobacco companies have joined the Master Settlement Agreement. 
26 There are three types of payments under the settlement: an initial allocation distributed across the first 
five years of payments, 1999-2003; annual payments, which are paid in perpetuity; and contributions to a 
Strategic Contribution Fund that compensates states’ previous lawsuit costs. $86.1 billion will go into the 
Strategic Contribution Fund, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures 2003 report “State 
Management and Allocation of Tobacco Settlement Revenue.” 
27 The report  “A Decade of Broke Promises: the 1998 State Tobacco Settlement Ten Years Later” was 
written by the Cancer Action  Network, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, the American Lung Association, 
and the America Heart Association. 
28 The nine states funding tobacco prevention programs at greater than 50% the CDC recommended levels 
are Alaska, Delaware, Wyoming, Hawaii, Montana, Maine, Vermont, South Dakota, and Colorado. 
29 See “The Sunken Billions: The Economic Justification for Fisheries Reform,” Agriculture and Rural 
Development, The World Bank, October 2008.   
Examples of Economic Studies on Specific Fisheries 
30 Fisher’s behaviour with individual vessel quotas — Over-capacity and potential rent. Five case studies. 
Marine Policy 32 (2008) 920–927. Study undertaken by: Asche, Frank et. al. 2008. E-mail addresses: 
Frank.Asche@uis.no and was undertaken independently of the PROFISH Rent Drain project.  
31 The Economic Potential of the Bangladesh Artisanal Hilsa Fishery. Study undertaken by Masud Ara 
Mome (Department of Fisheries, Bangladesh) through the Department of Economics, University of Iceland. 
Contact: masudara_momi@yahoo.co.uk  
32 Economic Assessment of Tonkin Gulf Fishery, Vietnam. Study undertaken by Nguyen Long (Research 
Institute for Marine Fisheries (RIMF), 224(170) Le Lai, Hai Phong, Vietnam). 
33 Fisheries in the Bohai and Yellow Sea. China Case Study for FAO/World Bank Rent Drain Project.  
Prepared by: Zijiang Yang, Chinese Academy of Fishery Sciences, zijy0505@cafs.ac.cn and Xiaojie Nie, 
Dalian Fisheries University, victory_sq@yahoo.co.uk 
34 The Peruvian Anchoveta Sector: Costs and Benefits. A study undertaken by Carlos E. Paredes, Instituto 
del Perú, cparedes@intelfin.com.pe and Maria Elena Gutierez, Intelfin, mgutierrez@intelfin.com.pe 
35 Case study of the Namibian hake fishshery. A study by U. Rashid Sumaila_and A. Dale Marsden for the 
FAO/World Bank rent drain project. Fisheries Economics Research Unit, Fisheries Centre, the University 
of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada. 